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Executive Summary 
The existing financial system in the United States is not working for 
Native Americans. The aggregate data on chronic Native American 
poverty, unemployment, and lack of reservation business activity indicates 
a substantial disconnect between tribal communities and traditional sources 
of development capital such as banks, credit unions, and other commercial 
lenders. Structural conditions in tribal communities do not embody the legal 
elements or collateral base required by commercial banks to provide loans 
and credit for Native American economic development. What tribal 
communities need is a new financial system, built upon an understanding of 
the unique economic and legal conditions of Native American nations, to 
provide access to capital on terms that are structurally and culturally 
consistent with the realities of Native American life. 
This policy paper describes an innovative program to create a new 
financial institution that can facilitate much-needed access to capital and 
affordable financial services for Native American nations: the Tribally 
Chartered Bank (TCB). The TCB would be a new banking system—rather 
than a new bank under the existing system—that would be chartered under 
tribal law and regulated by an independent tribally appointed governing 
body. Organized under the sovereign authority of one or more tribal 
governments and free from the short-term focus of publicly listed banks, the 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss1/1
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TCB would offer a means for tribes to secure the “patient capital” required 
for long-term economic and infrastructure development.
1
 The potential 
benefits of the TCB for Native American communities are substantial and 
far-reaching, including: 
! direct capital investment into reservation businesses, housing, 
and infrastructure; 
! a long-term approach to access and ROI on capital, designed 
specifically for the Native American paradigm;
2
 
! lending standards based on tribal needs and conditions, not bank 
shareholder demands; 
! opportunities to become the primary banking institution for 
emerging businesses such as legal cannabis and online gaming; 
! embracing a culture of creativity and innovation in financial 
products, processes, and technology. 
The TCB’s organizational structure and operational activities can be 
designed for mutually beneficial integration into existing American/global 
financial networks through: 
! a compact for cooperative oversight with U.S. agencies, 
providing transparency and legitimacy;  
! utilizing existing and accepted financial infrastructure such as 
SWIFT and NACHA; and 
  
                                                                                                                 
 1. Patient capital “bridges the gap between the efficiency and scale of market-based 
approaches and the social impact of pure philanthropy.  Patient capital has a high tolerance 
for risk, has long time horizons, is flexible to meet the needs of entrepreneurs, and is 
unwilling to sacrifice the needs of end consumers for the sake of shareholders.  At the same 
time, patient capital ultimately demands accountability in the form of a return of capital: 
proof that the underlying enterprise can grow sustainably in the long run.” See What Is 
Patient Capital?, ACUMEN, http://acumen.org/ideas/patient-capital/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
2017). 
 2. Return on Investment or “ROI” is commonly defined as the ratio of net income to 
the average capital employed in an investment or enterprise.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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! deploying state-of-the-art FinTech to enhance efficiency and 
reliability for transactions. 
The TCB would be an institutional means for Native American nations 
to address and improve the chronic conditions of poverty, unemployment, 
and underdevelopment within their communities. Tribes would create the 
financial system to recognize specific conditions and serve the unique needs 
of their members. By providing support for the formation and operations of 
the TCB, the U.S. government would also provide substantive redress for 
its historical policies that have directly resulted in the deleterious economic 
conditions experienced by tribes. In contrast with traditional banks that are 
constrained by the legal strictures of federal or state charters, the TCB 
would embody the beneficial flexibility of tribal laws and sovereignty, and 
provide a powerful instrument for enhancing Native American self-
determination. 
 
I. Introduction 
The economic and related development conditions of Native American 
nations and their members chronically and severely lag behind accepted 
standards for the rest of the United States. One-third of reservation-based 
Native Americans fall below the poverty line, and aggregate Native 
American unemployment is twice the U.S. average.
3
 Tribal governments, 
“unable to spur economic development” within reservation territories and 
operating without a typical municipal tax base, “struggle to provide even 
the most basic services” and infrastructure.4 The significant and chronic 
disparity in economic advancement between the Native American 
population and the U.S. average is illustrated by comparative 
unemployment rates, reflecting their progression prior to, during, and after 
the recent “Great Recession”: 
  
                                                                                                                 
 3. Poverty and Possibilities in Indian Country, FCNL INDIAN REP. (Friends Comm. on 
Nat’l Legislation, Washington, D.C.), Spring 2012, at 1, http://fcnl.org/assets/pubs/indian_ 
report/IR_Spring_2012_d4.pdf; see also Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian 
Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed? 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 758-59 (2001). 
 4. Jenny Small, Note, Financing Native Nations: Access to Capital Markets, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 463, 463-64 (2013); see Poverty and Possibilities in Indian Country, 
supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss1/1
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Table 1. United States National Unemployment Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: “American Indian” refers to individuals identifying as American Indian or Alaska Native 
alone or in combination with another racial category.  
Source: EPI analysis of basic monthly Current Population Survey micro data.5 
 
With these economic and human security conditions, it is little wonder 
some commentators have described Native American nations as the “fourth 
world.”6 
A fundamental element for any economic development program is access 
to capital, which makes purchases, investments, and asset building 
possible—increasing and sustaining economic activity. Although the United 
States controls more capital than any other nation, access to this capital is 
uneven within the country and numerous communities struggle to obtain 
funding for basic development.
7
 Nowhere is this inequality more starkly 
evident than in Native American nations, where poverty, unemployment, 
the prevalence of “food deserts,” and other symptoms of scarce capital 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Algernon Austin, High Unemployment Means Native Americans Are Still Waiting 
for an Economic Recovery, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.epi.org/ 
publication/high-unemployment-means-native-americans.  
 6. Small, supra note 4, at 473 (citing CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE 
RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 271 (2006) (“However favorable the new legal and policy 
framework might be, every Indian tribe in the postwar years faced challenges befitting a 
third world nation—some have called aboriginal peoples the fourth world.”); Amar Bhatia, 
The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with Lessons 
from the Fourth World, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 131 (2012)). 
 7. John Cassidy, Piketty's Inequality Story in Six Charts, NEW YORKER (Mar. 26, 
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/pikettys-inequality-story-in-six-charts. 
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manifest at far higher rates than the national average.
8
 “According to a 
report published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve . . . , 
‘insufficient access to capital’ . . . is a primary challenge” to economic 
development in Native American nations.
9
 
From Marx to Piketty, economists and scholars have understood the 
importance—and bemoaned the unequal distribution—of global capital for 
the better part of 200 years. Marx identified capital as a “social power,” 
without which people “cannot become masters of the productive forces of 
society.”10 In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty recognizes that 
“[b]efore production can begin, funds are needed for equipment and office 
space, to finance material and immaterial investments of all kinds, and of 
course to pay for housing.”11 For Native American communities, the 
chronic lack of available capital has caused development to stagnate in all 
of these basic elements of their economies. 
One element of the inequality of capital distribution in the United States 
is particularly unusual and counterintuitive from an economic perspective. 
In general, having a presence within a particular territory for an extended 
period of time is an advantage for a community of people in accumulating 
capital available within that area.
12
 Yet in the United States, extreme 
longevity of presence does not correlate with increased wealth—in fact, the 
opposite has manifested. Native Americans resided within the territory of 
the United States for thousands of years prior to European contact, yet 
today the small amount of land and resources they own and control is 
effectively “dead capital” that cannot be leveraged to create development 
opportunities.
13
 In essence, those who have lived in the United States the 
longest have accumulated the least, and for Native Americans this historical 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Alysa Landry, What Is a Food Desert? Do You Live in One? 23.5 Million in this 
Country Do,  INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 28, 2015), https://indiancountry medianetwork. 
com/culture/health-wellness/what-is-a-food-desert-do-you-live-in-one-235-million-in-this-coun 
try-do/. 
 9. Small, supra note 4, at 464 (quoting SUSAN WOODROW ET AL., GROWING ECONOMIES 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY: TAKING STOCK OF PROGRESS AND PARTNERSHIPS 4-6 (Apr. 2012) 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System White Paper), http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/conferences/GEIC-white-paper-20120501.pdf). 
 10. KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 65, 68 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1988) 
(1848). 
 11. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 385 (2014). 
 12. Id. at 368-70. 
 13. Shawn Regan, 5 Ways the Government Keeps Native Americans in Poverty, FORBES 
(Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/5-ways-the-government-
keeps-native-americans-in-poverty/#61ad1ed36cc6/. 
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anomaly has resulted in a situation where, according to Piketty, “[t]he past 
devours the future.”14 
For Native American nations, the lack of access to capital inhibits their 
ability to finance new projects such as housing, business development, and 
renewable energy that would benefit both the tribal communities and the 
United States.
15
 “Yet, despite their difficulty in accessing capital,” Native 
American nations possess “significant potential for economic growth” 
based on untapped resources, land, and sovereignty.
16
 The transformative 
opportunity embedded in this potential is beginning to inspire creative 
approaches to new development pathways, with tribal finance expert Gavin 
Clarkson identifying Native American nations as “America’s domestic 
emerging market.”17 Harnessing this potential and implementing 
development programs that can have a real impact on conditions within 
tribal communities will require not only inventive thinking, but also the 
creation of new and innovative economic institutions. 
Commenting on the current state of global capital distribution, Bill Gates 
has noted that “governments can play a constructive role in offsetting the 
snowballing tendencies” of inequality in access to capital when they 
embody the will to do so.
18
 In the government-to-government relationship 
between the United States and Native American nations, the federal and 
tribal governments have a mutual interest in facilitating the enhancement of 
Native American economic and human security development. Moreover, 
such work is directly connected to the U.S. government’s legal obligations 
as a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.
19
 The Articles relating to economic development 
address these obligations:
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 14. PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 571. 
 15. Small, supra note 4. 
 16. Id. at 464 (citing Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic 
Development: What Challenges Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for 
Economic Diversity?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 443 (2001-2002) (“Sovereignty is 
best defined as the vested powers of self-government, self-control, self-determination, and 
self-actualization.”)). 
 17. Id. (quoting Gavin Clarkson, Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private 
Equity into Indian Country as a Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 285, 285 
(2009)). 
 18. Bill Gates, Why Inequality Matters, GATESNOTES: THE BLOG OF BILL GATES (Oct. 13, 
2014), http://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-
Review. 
 19. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 
2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
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Article 21 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to 
the improvement of their economic and social conditions, 
including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, 
vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and 
social security. 
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, 
special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their 
economic and social conditions. . . . 
 . . . . 
Article 38 
States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, 
shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative 
measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.  
Article 39 
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and 
technical assistance from States and through international 
cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this 
Declaration.
20
 
The Declaration provides direct mandates (and in fact binding 
obligations under international law) for the U.S. government to take official 
action to facilitate improved economic development in tribal communities. 
These general obligations provide a framework for the United States to 
begin working with tribal governments on new policy initiatives to address 
the specific deficiencies experienced by Native American nations in 
accessing capital within existing financial systems, particularly in light of 
the failings of those systems so glaringly exposed by the recent financial 
crisis.  
The systemic breakdown in U.S. and global finance that occurred during 
the “Great Recession” period of 2007-10 revealed numerous weaknesses in 
the structure and performance of existing financial institutions. Subsequent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. Id. arts. 21, 38, 39.  
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analysis of those weaknesses has produced policy recommendations for 
improving the performance and equality of access to these institutions:
21
 
! establish short, simple, and direct connections between financial 
institutions and the end-users of capital; 
! prioritize transactions that place capital into the hands of people 
who will use it for on-the-ground development activities, rather 
than transactions between financial institutions in pursuit of 
corporate profits; and 
! create specialized institutions with a direct focus on serving 
specific types of capital users and needs, with business models 
and institutional priorities based on meeting those needs. 
These policy concepts are particularly relevant for addressing the 
endemic problems Native American nations experience in accessing 
sufficient capital to promote economic and human security development. 
II. Challenges For Tribes In Accessing Capital 
The problems Native American nations experience in accessing 
development capital can be seen as arising from three primary causes: (1) 
the historical and structural conditions of tribal communities; (2) the 
unwillingness of commercial lenders and other mainstream capital sources 
to conduct business with tribes and their members; and (3) the failure of the 
U.S. government to uphold and properly manage its legal and trust 
obligations to facilitate capital availability.
22
 
A. Historical and Structural Problems 
Thousands of years before Europeans first took to the sea in search of the 
“New World,” the indigenous people of North, Central, and South America 
had established unique and flourishing civilizations that stretched from the 
Arctic Circle to Tierra Del Fuego. While the nations of Europe languished 
in the Dark Ages, the indigenous nations of the Americas were creating 
scientific, cultural, and architectural achievements that are marvelous to 
ponder even today.
23
 A key element of the success of these societies was 
                                                                                                                 
 21. JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 259-60 (2015). 
 22. For a further detailed discussion of access to capital issues in Native American 
communities, see Small, supra note 4, at 467. 
 23. W. GREGORY GUEDEL, STRATEGIES AND METHODS FOR TRIBAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (2013). 
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their economic activity, which involved trade with other indigenous nations 
in combination with local endeavors that were harmonious with the natural 
world and sustainable with available resources.
24
 
The general picture of Native American political economy in the twenty-
first century is radically different from pre-Columbian times. The political 
subjugation of indigenous nations by European colonizers, combined with 
forced geographic dislocation from their ancestral lands and traditional 
trading partners, essentially destroyed the original paradigm of economic 
development in the Americas. Native American nations were forcibly 
removed from their ancestral territories by the U.S. government, thereby 
losing both the capital value of the land and the asset base of natural 
resources associated with it. This dislocation deprived tribes of untold 
billions of dollars’ worth of capital producing assets, and consigned them to 
areas of the United States that were considered economically undesirable by 
the U.S. government and American settlers.
25
 
The land that Native American nations retained typically included 
several conditions that prevent it from being effectively leveraged to obtain 
development capital: 
! reservations are often located in geographically isolated areas, 
far from established commercial and population centers that 
could provide a market base for tribal economic activity, and on 
land that is commonly devoid of natural economic resources;
26
 
! tribal lands generally have a “checkerboard” of varying title 
status, limiting the ability of tribal governments and businesses 
to put their lands into productive economic use;
27
 and 
! a lack of infrastructure investment leaves many tribal nations to 
cope with inadequate roads, utilities, and communication 
networks for economic development.
28
 
A further problem, and a puzzling irony, is inherent in the sovereign 
lands owned by a tribal government itself. To ensure the protections of 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE (2005). 
 26. See The Poverty Cycle, RUNNING STRONG FOR AMERICAN INDIAN YOUTH, 
http://indianyouth.org/american-indian-life/poverty-cycle (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
 27. GUEDEL, supra note 23. 
 28. See Housing & Infrastructure, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai. 
org/policy-issues/economic-development-commerce/housing-infrastructure (last visited Jan. 
17, 2017). 
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tribal sovereignty and prevent alienation to third parties, lands the tribal 
government holds title to are often converted into “trust land.”29 The U.S. 
government acknowledges that it holds such land “in trust” for the tribe, 
and thereby extends its own legal protections over the land against potential 
creditors or other outside entities.
30
 Tribal governments, however, cannot 
levy property taxes upon trust lands.
31
 This creates a “Catch-22” wherein 
tribes must place their land into trust in order to fully assert their sovereign 
jurisdiction over those lands, but by putting the land in trust they forfeit the 
sovereign capital revenue of property taxes that could be derived from their 
lands. Consequently, this deprives tribal governments of a stable (and often 
sizeable) revenue source that is available to almost every other jurisdiction 
in the United States to provide capital for infrastructure, essential services, 
and community development.
32
 
B. Commercial Capital Source Problems 
Economists and development scholars have long recognized that “[f]or 
any economy to grow, banking institutions must be available to help 
provide individuals with standard loans, and provide small businesses and 
industries with the necessary amount of capital to pay for wages, materials, 
and other developmental costs.”33 Even the Federal Reserve has noted “the 
shortage of banking institutions located near native communities as a 
primary barrier to accessing capital markets.”34 In some communities, 
Native Americans living on reservations may need to travel as far as thirty 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Office of Trust Services, INDIANAFFAIRS.GOV, http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWe 
Are/BIA/OTS/index.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2016) (“The Office of Trust Services carries 
out Indian Affairs trust responsibilities to Indian tribes and individuals and oversees all 
headquarter activities associated with management and protection of trust and restricted 
lands, natural resources, and real estate services.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Taxation, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/ 
tribal-governance/taxation (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (“In general, tribal governments lack 
parity with states, local governments, and the federal government in exercising taxing 
authority. For example, tribes are unable to levy property taxes because of the trust status of 
their land . . . .”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Ansson & Oravetz, supra note 16, at 462. 
 34. Small, supra note 4, at 485-86 (citing WOODROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; Ansson 
& Oravetz, supra note 16, at 462 (“In general, banking institutions have even failed to 
establish banking facilities within Indian country. For instance, the Navajo reservation, 
which has a population of more than 200,000 individuals, only has several banking facilities. 
Meanwhile, a border town, such as Gallup, New Mexico, with a population of 20,000, has 
almost three times as many as [sic] banks.”)). 
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miles to access an ATM—a barrier known as the “buckskin curtain.”35 This 
dearth of mainstream financial institutions has created a disproportionate 
unbanked population and a vacuum into which predatory lenders such as 
payday loan companies have moved, eroding tribal members’ personal 
capital with high interest rates and fees.
36
 As a result, Native Americans 
often find themselves in a negative cycle where they turn to predatory 
lenders because they cannot connect with traditional lenders, and then they 
become ineligible for future traditional lending due to their indebtedness to 
the predatory lenders.
37
 
Further still, Native-owned businesses that possess “adequate collateral 
and good credit histories” struggle to obtain capital for operations and 
expansion.
38
 For example, financing of more than $100,000 tends to be 
difficult for Native Americans and tribal nations to obtain, reflecting a 
seemingly unwritten risk-underwriting threshold beyond which most banks 
are unwilling to lend.
39
 Even Native Americans with above average income 
often have difficulty financing the purchase or improvement of a home, as 
banks remain wary of any reservation based collateral for their loans.
40
  
The unwillingness of the financial regulatory bodies to adopt policies 
and procedures that account for the conditions of tribal communities 
presents another significant barrier to capital access. On an institutional 
level, Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 appears (intentionally or 
otherwise) to preclude Native American nations from obtaining status as 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. at 485 (citing Ronald A. Wirtz, Breaching the “Buckskin Curtain,” FED. RES. 
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-
region/breaching-the-buckskin-curtain). 
 36. See id. (citing FIRST NATIONS DEV. INST., BORROWING TROUBLE: PREDATORY 
LENDING IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (2008)). 
 37. See id. (citing Predatory Lending in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 20 (2008) (“The effect of having a tribal population 
unbanked and subject to predatory financial firms is that it strips an already vulnerable 
population of the opportunity to advance by preventing them from building assets, equity 
and wealth.”)).  
 38. See id. (quoting WOODROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 4). 
 39. See id. (citing OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INSIGHTS REPORT: 
COMMERCIAL LENDING IN INDIAN COUNTRY: POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN A GROWING MARKET 
(Feb. 2016), http://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/insights/insights-
commercial-lending-indian-country.pdf). 
 40. See id. (citing Aaron Drue Johnson, Comment, Just Say No (to American 
Capitalism): Why American Indians Should Reject the Model Tribal Secured Transactions 
Act and Other Attempts to Promote Economic Assimilation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 107, 117 
(2010-2011)). 
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“accredited investors.”41 The regulation thereby prevents tribal 
governments from accessing and investing in various, potentially high 
return financial vehicles, which further “inhibit[s] capital formation and 
investment in Indian Country.”42 Tribes also do not qualify for exemption 
from SEC registration for bond issues enjoyed by municipal, county and 
state governments, thereby greatly inhibiting the raising of capital for street, 
sewer, water facilities and other capital improvements in tribal 
communities.
43
 
A concurrent problem is that banks and other traditional capital sources 
are reluctant to provide funding to tribal communities, as tribal sovereignty 
precludes the use of standard financial security mechanisms such as 
property liens, foreclosures, or repossession of goods.
44
 Tribal lands that 
have been placed into trust status cannot be leveraged as collectible 
collateral for bank financing, and the legal jurisdiction of tribal 
governments generally prevents property seizures and sales by outside 
commercial and law enforcement agencies.
45
 As a result, most American 
financial institutions do not do business with tribes or lend money for 
reservation business, housing, or other development activities, thereby 
perpetuating the obstacles to economic progress in tribal communities.
46
  
Despite federal incentives, non-native private lenders often forego 
providing needed banking services to tribal members due to perceived 
structural risks.
47
 The fear of sovereign immunity artificially raises the risk 
profile of tribal borrowers in the eyes of traditional banks, as does a lack of 
understanding of tribal law and legal systems.
48
 The inability of banks to 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Clarkson, supra note 17, at 285; see Small, supra note 4, at 477. See generally 
Accredited Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
accred.htm (last modified Oct. 21, 2014);  
 42. Small, supra note 4, at 477 (citing Native Am. Cap., LP, Policy Briefing: Native 
American Tribes Require Reg D Change (n.d.), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/265-
23/nac020306.pdf). 
 43. Native Am. Cap., LP, supra note 42; see Small, supra note 4, at 477. 
 44. Small, supra note 4, at 488. 
 45. See id. at 473. 
 46. Id. at 494. 
 47. Id. at 488 (citing Susan Woodrow & Fred Miller, Lending in Indian Country: The 
Story Behind the Model Tribal Secured Transaction Law, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2005, 
at 38, 39, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2005/11/lending-
indian-country-200511.authcheckdam.pdf). 
 48. See id. (citing Opportunities and Challenges for Economic Development in Indian 
Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Baking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 
52 (2011) (statement of Susan M. Woodrow, Community Development Advisor, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) (“[L]enders and others face confusing and uncertain rules, 
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utilize traditional default remedies such as foreclosure and repossession on 
tribal lands also contributes to an industry-wide reluctance to finance 
Native American development needs.
49
 
C. Conflict of Law Problems 
When banks provide loans to tribal borrowers, legal uncertainties often 
manifest due to conflicts between the laws governing the activities of 
federal or state chartered institutions and the sovereign legal status of tribal 
nations.
50
 Issues of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and available rights 
and remedies outlined in financial agreements between banks and tribal 
borrowers have resulted in varying court opinions that confuse rather than 
clarify the legal landscape.
51
 It is well defined, however, that contemporary 
banking law remains ill-equipped to deal with the sovereign status of 
Native American nations and their affiliated enterprises. 
A threshold challenge in applying existing financial laws to tribal 
transactions is determining jurisdiction for disputes. The overlap of tribal, 
federal, and state laws creates uncertainty regarding which courts can 
exercise personal and subject matter jurisdiction when a tribal borrower has 
a dispute with a federal or state chartered bank.
52
 In Cheyenne & Arapaho 
Tribes v. First Bank & Trust Co., the Tenth Circuit ruled that the tribal 
government borrowers waived their sovereign immunity from state court 
jurisdiction by signing contracts with First Bank & Trust Company. That 
court noted that while the Tribes’ accounts were subject to Oklahoma law 
the state court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because it was a 
matter exclusively for tribal courts.
53
 The situation for banks is further 
complicated when a borrower quit-claims or otherwise transfers its interest 
in loan collateral to a tribal entity after the loan is made, leaving the bank to 
deal with an ambiguous legal scenario outside the scope of the parties’ 
financing negotiations.
54
 
                                                                                                                 
and thus risky legal environments, that either deter them from doing business in Indian 
Country or raise the costs of doing business in tribal jurisdictions.”)). 
 49. Jon Swann, Native American Bank: Banking the Unbanked, COMMUNITIES & 
BANKING, Summer 2008, at 20, http://www.bostonfed.org/commdev/c&b/2008/summer/ 
swan_native_american_bank.pdf. 
 50. Small, supra note 4, at 494. 
 51. Id. at 488-89. 
 52. Id. at 488-93. 
 53. 560 F. App’x 699, 701 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 54. See Burley v. OneWest Bank, Civ. No. 2:14-1349 WBS EFB, 2014 WL 6835526 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2014). 
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Current banking laws have difficulty accounting for complex multi-party 
deals involving a lender, a tribe, and the U.S. government.
55
 Banks are 
subject to uncertainty regarding whether the terms of a deal they make with 
a tribe are enforceable if the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or other federal 
agency also has an interest in the transaction. For example, a bank’s right to 
apply the deposit of a depositor to offset that depositor’s debt has been held 
to be limited once the bank has notice of a third party interest in the funds 
on deposit.
56
 When a bank has knowledge that a third party, such as the 
BIA, has an interest in funds deposited in the account of a tribal borrower, 
the account must be considered special and the bank is prohibited from 
exercising any claimed right of set-off.
57
 Banks are also precluded from 
setting off the indebtedness of a tribal enterprise against tribal cash deposits 
if the deposits are considered federal appropriations of revenue-sharing 
funds between the United States and the tribe.
58
  
In situations where a federal agency has an interest in a tribal transaction, 
banks often find themselves limited in their ability to obtain relief from the 
United States if the parties fail to fulfill contractual obligations. For 
example, in Montana Bank of Circle, N.A. v. United States, the Court of 
Federal Claims held: (1) the failure of the BIA and an Indian-chartered 
corporation to enter a formal lease agreement underlying a bank loan was 
not a breach of contract the bank could enforce; (2) the bank could not 
recover as a third-party beneficiary; and (3) the statute requiring approval 
of Secretary of the Interior and Commission of Indian Affairs for a contract 
cannot be interpreted as mandating compensation by the United States for 
losses suffered as a result of contracts with third parties that were 
approved.
59
 Such uncertainties increase the risk profile for banks in 
considering loans to tribes, thereby reducing the approval rates for tribal 
loan applications. 
Another uncertainty that shadows tribal lending is whether a particular 
loan agreement is even enforceable in the first place. Banks have suffered 
unexpected losses in tribal loan transactions when they subsequently 
discovered that their agreement with the tribe lacked required approval 
from the federal government. In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lake of the 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Small, supra note 4, at 494. 
 56. Liberty Sav. Ass’n v. Sun Bank of Jacksonville, 572 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 57. See United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank of 
Chamberlain, S.D., 415 F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D. 1976); see also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Little 
Horn State Bank, No. 94-35391, 1995 WL 299886 (9th Cir. May 17, 1995).  
 58. Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 556 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.M. 1980). 
 59. 7 Cl. Ct. 601, 611, 614 (1985). 
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Torches Economic Development Corp., a trust indenture was held to be an 
unapproved “management contract,” and was thus void under the Indian 
Gaming Regulation Act.
60
 Lack of clarity as to which transactions may be 
subject to tribe specific laws, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 
repeatedly results in wasted legal efforts by banks and the dismissal of 
cases on jurisdictional grounds.
61
  
Moreover, the First Circuit illustrated in Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key 
Bank of Maine that tribes also experience uncertainty regarding federal 
approvals and protections for their deals and assets.
62
 The Penobscot court 
rejected the tribe’s assertion that a business loan for a fee simple land 
purchase was unenforceable due to a lack of approval of the agreement 
from the Secretary of the Interior under 25 U.S.C. § 81, holding that  
reading § 81 to apply to Indian lands purchased in fee simple for 
business reasons contradicts the statute’s purpose and its 
drafters’ intentions. Even those courts that have propounded a 
broad reading of § 81’s “relative to [Indian] lands” component, 
moreover, have not found that this phrase refers to Indian fee 
lands.
63
 
It can also be difficult for banks to obtain viable security interests in tribe-
specific collateral such as an individual’s right to receive future per capita 
payments, the issuance of which has been held to be a matter of exclusive 
discretion for the tribal government.
64
 
Banks and existing banking laws have chronically failed to recognize the 
specific socio-economic conditions and needs within tribal communities. 
Problematic federal laws struggle to allocate trust assets to Native 
Americans based on troubling racial categorizations such as “mixed-
bloods” and “full-bloods.”65 Lack of experience on the part of traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 60. 677 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1060-62 (W.D. Wis. 2010); see also Small, supra note 4, at 
488-89. The trust gave unapproved third parties the authority to set up working policy for a 
casino’s gaming operation in violation of federal statutes. Lake of the Torches, 77 F. Supp. 
2d at 1060-62. 
 61. See id. at 1061; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
No. EDCV 12-01278 VAP, 2012 WL 4718879, (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012); Small, supra note 
4, at 488-89. 
 62. 112 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 63. Id. at 552 (citing United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1214 
(7th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Shakopee v. Pan Am. Mgmt. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1200, 
1217-18 (D. Minn. 1985)). 
 64. DeCora v. DeCora (In re DeCora), 387 B.R. 230, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2008). 
 65. See Hackford v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 521 F. Supp. 541 (D. Utah 1981). 
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banks in handling trust funds and other restricted assets on behalf of Native 
American children has long been a problem, resulting in allegations of 
mishandling of trust obligations and illegal activity that deprives families of 
much-needed financial assets.
66
 Banks in some cases have been held to only 
nominal fiduciary standards in their dealings with tribal customers, being 
obligated only to avoid “material deception” in handling tribal 
transactions.
67
  
Federal courts have also been part of the problem by frequently 
demonstrating a distinct lack of understanding regarding the evolving 
nature of tribal economics and business activities. For example, transactions 
occurring off reservation are of increasing importance to tribal nations and 
businesses, yet in Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court the District 
Court of Montana denied relief sought by tribal borrowers in a repossession 
case because “[t]his transaction occurred outside the exterior boundaries of 
the reservation and is not of tribal importance.”68  
Conflicts are presently emerging between state and Tribal laws regarding 
short-term lending products, which are often provided to borrowers through 
online portals accessible nationwide. These conflicts complicate the 
electronic lending landscape within the United States and produce legal 
actions that can require the participation of tribes in widespread 
jurisdictions.
69
 Resolving the inherent legal conflicts between traditional 
lenders and tribal borrowers calls for a new legal regime that can 
adequately account for the sovereignty, legal status, and the unique 
economic conditions of Native American nations. 
D. U.S. Government Trust Management Problems 
An exacerbating factor that compounds the financial struggles of Native 
American nations is their inability to gain full access to capital and 
economic resources they already own.
70
 Dating back to the nineteenth 
century, the U.S. government has assumed a fiduciary trust responsibility 
on behalf of Native American nations and their members to manage cash, 
land, and natural resources worth tens of billions of dollars.
71
 Among the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. United States v. Barnett, 7 F. Supp. 573, 576 (N.D. Okla. 1934). 
 67. Hackford, 521 F. Supp. at 550. 
 68. 690 F. Supp. 919, 922 (D. Mont. 1988). 
 69. See Otoe-Missouri Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105 
(2d Cir. 2014) (detailing the issues involved in short-term lending operations conducted by 
tribally owned businesses). 
 70. See Small, supra note 4, at 476. 
 71. Office of Trust Services, supra note 29. 
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many trust activities it undertakes, the U.S. government leases surface use 
and mineral rights on tribal property and is responsible for depositing the 
monetary proceeds from such activities into capital accounts the United 
States manages for tribes and individual Native Americans.
72
 In theory, this 
trust concept was designed to protect tribes and their members from 
exploitation by outside parties, and to help the tribal asset base grow for the 
benefit of future generations. Unfortunately, the various federal agencies in 
charge of trust assets have chronically mismanaged them, and the amount 
of actual capital made available for beneficial use by tribal communities is 
only a small fraction of the true value of the assets—effectively turning 
those assets into “dead capital.”73 
Prior to instituting the tribal “trust lands” policy (with its attendant 
problems noted above), the U.S. government undertook a radically different 
approach from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. During this 
“termination era,” the federal government sought to end tribal ownership of 
land altogether through a policy that would create, in the words of President 
Theodore Roosevelt, “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal 
mass.”74 The U.S. government ordered the “termination” of ownership of 
lands by tribal governments, with fee simple ownership of those lands being 
allotted in shares to individual tribal members. Two primary results 
followed, both of which devastated the potential land-capital base of Native 
American nations:  
(1) unscrupulous real estate speculators acquired (legally or 
otherwise) vast tracks of the most desirable properties previously 
owned by tribal governments and paid negligible value to tribal 
members for their lands. This deprived tribal communities of 
both the short and long-term capital value of the land that the 
“termination” policy was ostensibly designed to provide; and 
(2) due to a failure of the U.S. government to provide an orderly 
process for trans-generational ownership succession of allotted 
tribal lands, the land that remained in tribal members’ ownership 
became increasingly fractionated over time. Today, many 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Small, supra note 4, at 474-77. 
 73. Hernando de Soto, Dead Capital and the Poor, SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 2001, at 
13, 17. 
 74. Teddy Roosevelt, INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE COMMONS. http://indigenous knowledge. 
org/discussion/native-conversations/big-question-1-does-tribalism-have-a-valid-role-in-modern-
life/post/teddy-roosevelt/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (excerpt from President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address, Dec. 3, 1901). 
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parcels of land within reservations have dozens (sometimes 
hundreds) of owners, each holding a small percentage of the 
property title. This fractionation of ownership makes beneficial 
economic use of the land almost impossible, as securing 
sale/lease authorizations from so many owners is often 
unattainable.
75
 
Beyond the misguided and destructive policies regarding tribal lands, the 
United States further deprived tribes of capital generated from their retained 
territory. During the twentieth century and continuing today, the 
Department of Interior has taken responsibility for stewarding the 
oil/mineral leases and other resource-based revenue on over 56 million 
acres of tribal land.
76
 The federal trust relationship requires the United 
States to effectively manage the “acquisition, disposal, rights-of-way, 
leasing and sales” of tribal land resources, and assist tribes “in the 
management, development, and protection of trust land and natural resource 
assets.”77 Unfortunately, gross mismanagement of these assets became the 
norm, depriving Native American communities of vast sums of desperately 
needed capital. 
The most prominent example of trust mismanagement leading to the 
destruction of Native capital is reflected in the recent “Cobell Settlement.”78 
While serving as Treasurer of the Blackfeet Nation, Ms. Eloise Cobell 
discovered irregularities in the federal management records of funds held in 
trust by the United States for the benefit of hundreds of thousands of Native 
Americans. In many instances, Ms. Cobell discovered no records at all. 
Working with the Intertribal Monitoring Association, she attempted in the 
1980s and 1990s to convince the responsible federal government agencies 
of the need for procedural reform and an accounting of the trust funds. 
When the reform effort failed to achieve progress, Ms. Cobell initiated a 
class action lawsuit in federal court to force the administrative reform and 
compel an accounting from the U.S. government of the trust funds 
belonging to individual Native Americans.
79
 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Small, supra note 4, at 471-73. 
 76. Q & A: Department of the Interior’s Final Leasing Reform, INDIANAFFAIRS.GOV, 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-037327.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 
2016). 
 77. Office of Trust Services, supra note 29. 
 78. See Small, supra note 4, at 474-77. 
 79. Complaint at 4, Cobell v. Babbitt, No. 1:96CV01285 (D.D.C. 1996), 
http://www.indiantrust.com/docs/1996.06.10_Cobell_Complaint.pdf. 
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After several trials over thirteen years, the federal agencies responsible 
for managing trust funds for Native Americans effectively admitted they 
could not produce a reasonable accounting of their actions.
80
 It was clear 
from the evidence that for decades, billions of dollars in revenue collected 
by the government—money that was gained from the lease of tribal lands 
that should have gone into trust for native people—had simply 
disappeared.
81
 The exact amount of money that was unaccounted for has 
never been determined, due primarily to the government’s failure to keep 
even basic records of the business transactions occurring on tribal lands. 
Ultimately, the Cobell trust litigation was resolved in a settlement whereby 
the U.S. government pledged a total of $4.3 billion in restitution and 
supporting programs for tribal communities—but the average settlement 
payment check received by individual Native Americans was only $1,000.
82
 
The inability of Native American nations to unlock and utilize capital 
that should be available to them has severely limited their development 
progress. The combination of these structural, commercial, and inter-
governmental factors has brought the lack of available capital for tribal 
communities to a point of socio-economic crisis. In response, in 2015 the 
United States Senate conducted hearings to investigate the problems and 
seek pathways toward solutions. 
III. United States Senate Oversight Hearing on Access to Capital in Indian 
Country 
On June 17, 2015, the United States Senate conducted a public inquiry 
entitled the “Oversight Hearing on Accessing Capital in Indian Country.” 
The purpose of the hearing was to explore means for tribes “to improve 
access to capital and their experiences working with Federal partners” and 
“help Indian communities to prosper and to enjoy healthier lives.”83 The 
Oversight Hearing was chaired by Senator John Barrasso (R-Wyoming), 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and participants 
included Senator Michael Crapo (R-Idaho), Senator Al Franken (D-
Minnesota), Senator Jon Tester (D-Montana), Alejandra Castillo (National 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Cobell v. Kempthorne, Civial Action 
No. 96-1285 (JR) (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.indiantrust.com/docs/oct_trial.pdf 
 81. Id.  
 82. GUEDEL, supra note 23. 
 83. Accessing Capital in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Hearing: Accessing Capital], http://www.indian. 
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Director, Minority Business Development Agency), Derek Watchman 
(Chair, National Center for American Indian Enterprise Development), 
Ross Hill (CEO, Bank2), and Dante Desiderio (Executive Director, Native 
American Finance Officers Association).
84
 
The Oversight Hearing produced a number of key findings regarding the 
current state of capital access for Native American nations: 
! Economic development and the capital necessary for that 
development are significant needs in Native communities. This 
development relies on capital to start, support, and maintain 
businesses of all sizes; 
! Native and tribal-owned businesses face unique challenges 
beyond those that non-native businesses in general face. For 
example, many tribes are located in remote areas, far away from 
transportation, distribution, or communication systems suitable 
for sustainable commerce; 
! Individual Native Americans do not own as many small 
businesses compared to other demographic groups. For the most 
part, they also do not receive business or financial assistance 
from tribes. Native-owned businesses, however, tend to employ 
more people than those operated by small business owners in 
other demographic categories, thereby offering a greater 
potential impact on employment levels if adequately funded for 
growth; and 
! Cost-effective capital for Native American nations is lacking in 
both access and effectiveness in meeting the intended purposes, 
i.e., the limitations on the use of capital imposed by lenders 
render tribes unable to deploy it where it is needed most.
85
 
The testimony of the Senators and witnesses participating in the 
Oversight Hearing provided further insight into the specific conditions and 
challenges Native American nations and their members confront in seeking 
capital to advance their development programs. The clear consensus from 
the Oversight Hearing is that a substantial and urgent need for increased 
access to capital exists for tribal communities, as the mainstream financial 
institutions and federal government programs have chronically proven 
themselves inadequate in providing funding opportunities for economic and 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. at III. 
 85. Id. at 1-2. 
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community development. The findings of the U.S. Senate mandate a new 
and more effective institutional and government-to-government partnering 
approach for increasing the capital available to Native American nations. 
IV. A Sovereign Solution – The Tribally Chartered Bank 
In order to overcome their chronic lack of access to capital, Native 
American nations cannot hope to rely on improvements within the existing 
financial systems. Indeed, the structural format and economic priorities of 
those systems virtually ensure the continuation of the status quo, where 
tribal communities are overlooked, underserved, and struggle to obtain 
negligible amounts of capital to advance their development. Native 
American nations must therefore disrupt this inertia by introducing a new 
dynamic element into the landscape of financial institutions. 
To that end, a new Tribally Chartered Bank system (TCB) could provide 
an innovative solution to the problem of insufficient capital for tribal 
development within for tribal communities.
86
 This Section describes the 
legal basis, organizational structure, and potential benefits of the TCB for 
Native American nations, their partners, and the tribal citizens they 
represent. 
A. Concept Plan and Benefits 
The TCB is a proposed banking system—rather than a new bank under 
the existing system—that would be chartered under tribal law and regulated 
by a tribally appointed governing body. Organized under the sovereign 
authority of one or more tribal governments and free from the short-term 
focus of publicly listed banks, the TCB would offer a means for tribes to 
secure the “patient capital” required for long-term economic and 
                                                                                                                 
 86. The TCB project concept is developing under the leadership of economic advisor J.D. 
Colbert, whose past positions include serving as President of Native American Bank, N.A. and 
as Bank Examiner for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. See David Melmer, A Conversation 
with Chickasaw/Creek J.D. Colbert of Native American Bank, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK (Mar. 29, 2006), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2006/03/29/conversa 
tion-chickasawcreek-jd-colbert-native-american-bank-106156. The TCB structure and 
operational approach described in this article is founded upon Colbert’s presentation 
“Establishing a Sovereign Financial System” at the University of Washington Jackson School 
of International Studies Tribal Development Colloquium, held on May 28-29, 2015. See Foster 
Pepper PLLC Videos, Native American Colloquium: Establishing a Sovereign Financial 
System, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ad5q2Zs_csM 
&feature=youtu.be (address by J.D. Colbert). 
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infrastructure development. The potential benefits of the TCB for Native 
American communities are substantial and far-reaching, including: 
! direct capital investment into reservation businesses, housing, 
and infrastructure; 
! a long-term, “patient capital” approach to access and ROI on 
capital investments, designed specifically for the Native 
American paradigm; 
! lending standards based on tribal needs and conditions, not bank 
shareholder demands; 
! facilitation and leveraging of existing federal loan guarantee 
programs for tribal communities; 
! opportunities to become the primary banking institution for 
emerging businesses such as legal cannabis and online gaming; 
and 
! embracing a culture of creativity and innovation in financial 
products, processes and technology by the TCB and the tribal 
bank regulatory body. 
The TCB’s organizational structure and operational activities can be 
designed for mutually beneficial integration into existing American/global 
financial networks through: 
! compacting for cooperative oversight with U.S. agencies, 
providing transparency and legitimacy; 
! utilizing existing and accepted financial infrastructure such as 
SWIFT and NACHA; and 
! deploying state-of-the-art FinTech to enhance efficiency and 
reliability for transactions. 
The TCB would be an institutional means for Native American nations 
to address and improve the chronic conditions of poverty, unemployment, 
and underdevelopment within their communities. By providing support for 
the formation and operations of the TCB, the U.S. government would also 
provide substantive redress for its historical policies that have directly 
resulted in the deleterious economic conditions experienced by tribes. In 
contrast with traditional banks that are constrained by the legal strictures of 
federal or state charters, the TCB would embody the beneficial flexibility of 
tribal laws and sovereignty, and provide a powerful instrument to enhance 
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Native American self-determination.
87
 Banks chartered as a TCB would 
also be able to organize as tribal 17 corporations to limit their tax exposure 
and gain a competitive financial advantage.
88
 
Banks chartered under tribal law would be imbued with the sovereign 
powers and immunities of tribal governments, allowing them to participate 
in emerging economic opportunities such as online gaming and cannabis 
retailing that federal law currently either explicitly or effectively prohibits 
for federal and state chartered banks.
89
 Businesses conducting these 
activities would generate cash that is presently “unbankable,” as federal 
regulations either prohibit or otherwise dissuade traditional commercial 
banks from accepting deposits from these forms of commerce.
90
 A TCB 
chartered under sovereign tribal law, however, could become the primary 
depository agency for these funds, in a manner consistent with the United 
                                                                                                                 
 87. For a detailed discussion of innovative approaches to structuring tribal banking 
enterprises, including the use of Section 17 corporations and tribally owned holding 
companies, see Small, supra note 4. 
 88. GUEDEL, supra note 23, at 99-104; see Small, supra note 4, at 504. 
 89. See David Kelly, Limited by U.S. Banking Rules, Pot Businesses Rely on Bags of 
Cash and Armed Guards, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
pot-banking-20151219-story.html. 
“Banks face a number of risks if they choose to serve the industry, up to and 
including closure of their institutions,” said Amanda Averch, Director of 
Communications for the Colorado Bankers Assn. “Regulators can impose civil 
money penalties, cease-and-desist orders, fines and can ban bankers from their 
careers for life.” 
Id. 
 90. Online Gambling: Don’t Roll the Dice, ARCHIVES.FBI.GOV (June 6, 2007), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2007/june/gambling_060607. 
“You can go to Vegas. You can go to Atlantic City. You can go to a racetrack. 
You can go to those places and gamble legally. But don’t do it online. It’s 
against the law,” says Leslie Bryant, head of our Cyber Crime Fraud unit at FBI 
Headquarters. 
 . . . . 
We’ve also had success against companies supporting the money flows behind 
virtual gambling. In January, for example, two Canadians were charged with 
operating an Internet payment services company that transferred billions of 
dollars in illegal gambling proceeds between U.S. citizens and the owners of 
online gambling sites outside the country. 
In 2003, another Internet financial services company paid $10 million in a civil 
agreement to settle allegations that it aided illegal offshore and online gambling 
agreements. The U.S. government has also settled several cases with online 
businesses that have accepted money to market virtual gambling operations. 
Id.  
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States Department of Justice mandate that tribal commerce related to such 
activities “contain robust controls and procedures.”91  
Two graphs illustrate the scale of the current and projected revenue from 
online gaming activity and legal cannabis sales and the corresponding 
economic opportunity for the TCB to service these revenue streams: 
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
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https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
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These two activities are generating billions of dollars of revenue each 
year—almost none of which is being put to constructive use in the existing 
U.S. banking system. With federal and state chartered banks unable or 
unwilling to accept deposits from these economic activities, the billions of 
dollars in annual revenue generated from the activities instead circulates 
untraceably within the “cash economy,” an unregulated realm of finance 
that presents public safety challenges and is highly inconvenient for 
legitimate commercial actors.
92
  
Substantial portions of gaming and cannabis funds are also being 
channeled to off-shore accounts or money-laundering schemes, creating a 
huge problem for U.S. law enforcement.
93
 The United States Department of 
Justice is now specifically seeking to partner with tribal governments in 
“[p]reventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal 
enterprises, gangs, and cartels.”94 The tribal governments organizing the 
TCB could help resolve these problems by entering into a compact for 
cooperative oversight with U.S. financial agencies for depository receipts 
and reporting, thereby taking these billions of dollars out of the hands of 
foreign and/or or unlawful entities and placing them into a legitimate and 
regulated “on-shore” bank. 
The direct and potentially gigantic financial benefit for Native American 
nations would be the TCB’s ability to generate fee revenue from the 
financial services it provides to these areas of commerce and to leverage the 
cash deposits to provide the source capital for financing development in 
tribal communities. 
B. Strategic Approach 
The purpose of the TCB would not be to compete with existing banks 
and replicate their standard activities, which have obviously fallen short in 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See Editorial, The Perils of Pot’s Cash Economy,  L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016, 5:00 
A.M.), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-prop64-banking-20161019-snap-story. 
html. 
 93. James Jarman,  Marijuana Banking, Money Laundering, and the Government,  
KRDO.COM (July 15, 2016, 5:48 AM MDT),  http://www.krdo.com/news/local-news/mari 
juana-banking-money-laundering-and-the-government-/35606891 
 94. Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, First Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Criminal Chiefs, 
Appellate Chiefs, OCDETF Coordinators, Tribal Liaisons, Policy Statement Regarding 
Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/11/policystatementregardingmarijuanaissuesinindianc
ountry2.pdf. 
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funding Native American development. Instead, the TCB should focus on 
filling the void commercial banks have created through their lack of service 
to tribal communities,
95
 and utilize electronic technology in lieu of costly 
(and commercially unnecessary) physical infrastructure for facilitating 
capital transactions. 
To that end, the TCB from conception should adopt three strategic 
priorities for improving tribal access to capital: 
(1) create a culture of financial innovation, for both the scope of 
services to tribal communities and the delivery methods for those 
services; 
(2) provide banking services to under/unbanked areas of lawful 
commerce, including traditionally overlooked customers in tribal 
communities and new emerging ventures (e.g., online gaming & 
legal cannabis); and 
(3) emphasize “real time” electronic payments and settlements, 
employing affordable and readily upgradeable internet-based 
technologies. 
Building a network of traditional brick-and-mortar depository banks 
accessible to all 566 federally recognized tribes would be too expensive and 
take too long to have a real impact within a relevant time period. Instead, 
the TCB can utilize electronic payment technology to leap forward into 
next-generation banking activities, and use internet-based access to connect 
with the multitude of Native American nations. In lieu of expensive multi-
state marketing campaigns, the TCB can partner with national tribal 
organizations such as the National Congress of American Indians and the 
Native American Finance Officers Association to help inform tribal 
communities of the TCB’s programs.  
For tribes whose economic prospects have been limited by geographic 
isolation, the ability to participate in the global economy through electronic 
financial transactions via a tribally chartered bank presents the opportunity 
to engage with potentially limitless customers who need never set foot on 
the reservation. By combining the new legal regime of a tribal banking 
charter with existing technology and inherent tribal sovereignty, Native 
American nations can obtain capital on their own terms for investing in 
self-directed economic development. The initial step in the institutional 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See Small, supra note 4, at 509. 
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formation of the TCB is for the sponsoring tribe(s) to adopt a Tribal 
Banking Code and create a Tribal Banking Commission. 
C. The Tribal Banking Code, Tribal Banking Commission, and TCBs 
The foundational legal element for the structure and operations of the 
TCB will be a new Tribal Banking Code—a set of laws that authorize the 
TCB’s creation and govern its activities. The sponsoring tribe(s) for the 
TCB would undertake the formation of the Tribal Banking Code as a 
sovereign political action, ratified in accordance with the required 
procedures in the applicable tribal Constitution(s). Although the Tribal 
Banking Code could be established as an independent body of sovereign 
tribal law, the existing banking codes for federal/state chartered banks 
should be studied for best practices and guidance. These banking codes 
would help to smooth the process for acceptance of the TCB into global 
financial networks.
96
 Key elements and priorities for an effective Tribal 
Banking Code include: 
! threshold standards for capitalization and organization of TCB 
operations; 
! transparency, conflict of interest, and insider-dealing regulations; 
! consumer protection and public disclosure requirements; 
! compliance standards for protecting customer privacy and 
account security ; 
! rigorous but efficient bank examination protocols; and 
! regular evaluations and CAMELS-type ratings of all TCB 
institutions.
97
 
Although the TBC would follow tribal law, tribal legislatures should 
consult with U.S. banking regulators and incorporate appropriate provisions 
for compliance with major U.S. federal banking laws into the Tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Information regarding structural models and baseline requirements for new banking 
ventures is discussed in detail in OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL: CHARTERS (Sept. 2016), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf. 
 97. The FDIC’s Uniform Financial Institution Rating System applicable to U.S.-
chartered banks utilizes financial assessment categories known by the acronym 
“CAMELS” – Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to 
Risk. See Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 62 Fed. Reg. 752 (Jan. 6, 1997), 
https://www. fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/UFIR.pdf. 
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Banking Code. Of particular importance will be compliance with the Anti-
Money Laundering Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, the PATRIOT Act, and 
Know Your Customer rules.
98
 This approach will acknowledge the practical 
reality of the dominant status of U.S. regulations in the global financial 
system, increase opportunities to obtain beneficial technical assistance from 
federal agencies, and help accelerate the implementation and acceptance of 
the TCB into global payment and credit systems. 
The Tribal Banking Code could create the structural framework for the 
TCB system through the establishment of a Tribal Banking Commission 
that will be empowered with supervisory and regulatory authority over the 
banking entities chartered in accordance with the Tribal Banking Code. The 
Tribal Banking Commission will be an independent regulatory body of the 
tribal nation(s) sponsoring the TCB system; it will be imbued with the 
sovereign powers and immunities of the tribal government(s) and will have 
responsibility for the creation, regulation, and regular examination of TCBs. 
The initial Commission could be established with a Governing Board 
consisting of approximately five to seven members, appointed pursuant to 
the tribe’s internal processes for board appointments and with the 
experience qualifications specified by the sponsoring tribe(s).
99
 Ideal Board 
members for the Tribal Banking Commission will have significant prior 
experience with commercial banking, banking law, and/or service with a 
federal or state bank regulatory agency.  
The Tribal Banking Commission could also appoint a Bank 
Commissioner—the Tribal Banking Commission’s day-to-day operations 
manager and primary public figure. An early priority for the Tribal Banking 
Commission and its Commissioner should be the pursuit of a Cooperative 
Oversight Agreement (Compact?) with U.S. banking regulators in order to 
coordinate on a co-regulation regime that will strengthen the legitimacy of 
the TCB system by providing access to federal investigative and 
enforcement resources for legal compliance issues.
100
 In addition to its 
                                                                                                                 
 98. FOREST E. MYERS, BASICS FOR BANK DIRECTORS 5-19 (4th ed. 2005). 
 99. The qualifications and integrity of the members of the Governing Board are a 
crucial element for the successful launch and management of the TCB. The process for 
vetting potential appointees to the Governing Board should prioritize review of each 
candidate’s experience in banking operations, regulatory compliance, and detailed 
understanding of both applicable Tribal and federal laws regarding bank chartering.  
 100. Co-regulation is a standard aspect of U.S. and global financial systems, and is 
gaining increased prominence due to the proliferation of domestic and international financial 
vehicles and regulations. See, e.g., Sophie Baker & Anish Puaar, Market Infrastructure 
Firms Urged to Take a ‘Co-regulation’ Approach, FINANCIAL NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013), http:// 
www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-09-18/sibos-2013-market-infrastructure-coregulation 
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institutional duties, the Tribal Banking Commission should envision and 
foster a culture of innovation and creativity in the financial products, 
processes, and service delivery of the banks it charters.  
The Tribal Banking Commission should be organized to be financially 
self-supporting and self-sustaining, with revenue derived through fees and 
assessments levied upon the banks it charters. This will be accomplished 
within the Commission’s primary activity: issuing bank charters to Tribally 
Chartered Banks. The TCBs will be the entities that directly manage the 
capital within the TCB system, provide the public interface for the system, 
facilitate payments and deposits, and act as the vehicle for providing access 
to capital for development in tribal communities.  
The initial TCBs will be organized as part of the overall creation of the 
TCB system, and will connect directly with the sponsoring tribe(s). The 
Tribal Banking Commission may also charter TCBs that are formed and 
owned by other federally recognized Indian tribes. Any TCBs formed by 
other tribes and chartered by the Tribal Banking Commission shall be 
subject to the supervisory, regulatory, and examination authority of the 
Commission. 
Table 4. TCB Governance and Regulatory Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
(“Because the financial industry is so busy following one regulation after the other, it has no 
time, money or resources to go into market requirements. . . . We need to go for co-
regulation, where the regulator and the financial industry sit together and define the rules 
and regulations.”) (quoting Michael Steinbach, chief executive and chairman of the board of 
directors at the Dutch payment processing firm Equens SE). 
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The primary mission of the TCB system is to facilitate increased access 
to capital for tribal communities. An integral part of the program for 
achieving this mission is facilitating existing capital access programs. As 
noted during the U.S. Senate Oversight Hearing, there are numerous federal 
programs that offer loans, loan guarantees, and other financing vehicles for 
Native American development projects on favorable terms.
101
  
In addition to the BIA, funding programs specifically designed for 
Native American nations are offered by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Energy, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, the Economic Development Agency, the Department 
of Veterans Affairs, and many others.
102
 These programs are, however, 
chronically underutilized and have never come close to achieving their full 
potential. Two primary reasons for this failing are: (1) a lack of general 
knowledge about the programs within the commercial lending community 
and (2) a lack of experience, and/or will, of commercial lenders in fulfilling 
the federal requirements and procedures to access the programs.
103
 The 
TCB will be uniquely placed to fill this gap. It should emphasize 
communication and partnering with federal agencies that provide financing 
support for tribal development, and in the process become the one-stop-
shop where tribal communities can learn about and participate in the 
various funding programs the U.S. government offers. 
In order to efficiently achieve the goal of facilitating increased access to 
capital for Native American nations, TCBs must adopt a “cutting edge” and 
“lean-and-mean” approach to the scope of services they provide. Investing 
capital to create traditional brick-and-mortar banking infrastructure will 
reduce the amount of capital TCBs can invest back into tribal communities, 
thereby undermining the driving purpose for the program. To alleviate that 
issue, TCBs could initially be conceived as limited purpose banks focusing 
on advanced electronic commerce, including serving as a preferred platform 
for electronic payments and fund transfers for commercial and individual 
customers. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 101. Hearing: Accessing Capital, supra note 83. 
 102. Federal Loan Programs for Economic and Community Development Throughout 
Indian Country and Alaska, BIA.GOV (Aug. 2012), http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xieed/ 
documents/document/idc-022680.pdf.  
 103. Hearing: Accessing Capital, supra note 83. 
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D. Twenty-first Century E-Commerce 
The rapidly changing nature of the ways people handle money in every 
day transactions presents a prime opportunity for the TCB concept. Instead 
of withdrawing cash from the bank before making subsequent purchases, 
people now simply place a card, phone, or watch next to an electronic 
terminal at the shop checkout counter. Increasingly, individuals do not even 
leave home to make such purchases. Instead, they use web portals such as 
Amazon to buy everything from gifts to groceries; even high-capital 
transactions such as mortgage loans are often completed entirely via 
electronic communication.
104
 By focusing on the high technology/low 
infrastructure model of commerce, the TCB can participate efficiently in 
the current and emerging electronic capital transactions that will be 
dominant throughout the twenty-first century. 
The TCB’s initial primary commercial activities should focus on real-
time electronic fund transfers, payments, and receipts. Utilizing 
technologies to facilitate instantaneous electronic payments and transfers of 
funds could enable the TCB to quickly integrate into fee-generating 
commerce streams including debit card networks; VISA, MasterCard, and 
American Express systems; the use of e-mail/e-transfer to make instant 
payments; membership in the NACHA electronic payments association, the 
Federal Reserve wire system, and the Depository Trust Company; and retail 
payment networks such as Apple Pay and PayPal.  
Focusing on electronic capital transfers will also position TCBs for 
participation in the emerging e-currency commerce based on block chain 
platforms such as Bitcoin.
105
 Focusing on e-commerce for fee generation, 
rather than the traditional banking approach that bases revenue on interest 
charges of loans will be advantageous to the operations and growth of 
TCBs in numerous ways, including: 
! a reduced credit risk profile for bank assets needed to sustain 
operations; 
! lower reserve capital requirements related to operational assets; 
and 
                                                                                                                 
 104. The author recently refinanced a home mortgage without ever setting foot in a bank 
or escrow office, and with all communication, document execution, and payment transfers 
accomplished via the internet. 
 105. Lynnley Browning, Oglala Sioux Hope Bitcoin Alternative, Mazacoin, Will Change 
Economic Woes, NEWSWEEK.COM (Aug. 14, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/ 
2014/08/22/tribe-brought-you-custers-last-stand-sitting-bulls-bitcoin-264440.html. 
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! the ability to maintain smaller Allowance for Loan and Lease  
Losses (“ALLL”) than peer institutions.106  
The emphasis on electronic fee-for-service to produce topline revenue 
also reflects the specific realities of the TCB’s mission to serve the needs of 
Native American nations. The “patient capital” TCBs will provide to 
finance tribal development projects will need to be structured on long-term 
payback timeframes and below-market interest rates. Thus, the fee revenue 
from e-commerce will be the TCBs’ primary profit engine, allowing the 
TCBs to provide tribal development financing on lower-profit terms that 
traditional banks refuse to offer. 
E. Innovation and FinTech Partnering 
Serving as the foundation for advanced commerce requires the TCB to 
incorporate forward-looking technology in all of its operations. The key to 
successfully implementing the vision of creating a nimble and efficient 
electronic commerce enterprise is for TCBs to partner with financial 
technology firms (“FinTech”) that are rapidly and constantly innovating 
financial products. FinTech companies are currently offering systems 
designed to move money rapidly across a variety of mobile platforms; the 
companies also focus their business models on connecting their technology 
with global financial systems and the attendant payment and settlement 
regimes.
107
 These technologies facilitate rapidly growing consumer demand 
for same-day payments and settlements, mobile banking and mobile 
payments, seamless integration of technological platform, and timely 
financial transaction reporting and tracking. 
Because only the very largest banking institutions can afford to develop 
their own proprietary IT platforms and functionality, the majority of 
financial institutions rely wholly upon third party FinTech providers for 
their core IT processing and transaction platforms.
108
 With little to no 
                                                                                                                 
 106. The ALLL is a calculated reserve that financial institutions establish in relation to 
the estimated credit risk within the institution’s assets. This credit risk represents the charge-
offs that will most likely be realized against an institution’s operating income as of the 
financial statement end date. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interagency 
Policy Statement on the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses at 2 (OCC Bulletin 2006-47, 
Dec. 13, 2006), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2006/bulletin-2006-47a.pdf. 
 107. Maria Aspan, Why Fintech Is One of the Most Promising Industries of 2015,  INC. 
MAG. (Sept. 2015), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201509/maria-aspan/2015-inc5000-fintech-
finally-lifts-off.html. 
 108. Id.  The market for Core IT processing and electronic platform systems for banking 
is one dominated by four FinTech companies: FIS, Fiserv, D+H and Jack Henry. Penny 
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control over the core-processing platform for their financial transactions 
and standard services, the average bank has a difficult time obtaining a 
competitive advantage in the market because it lacks the ability to 
positively differentiate their products and services. The TCB’s inherent 
competitive advantage of tribal sovereignty, however, presents an attractive 
new opportunity for FinTech companies to become market leaders— 
particularly by providing electronic systems to facilitate the previously 
discussed “unbankable” commerce the TCB is intended to capture.  
The chance to become the leading provider in these emerging industries 
is a lucrative proposition for FinTech providers, and the TCB could 
leverage this unique opportunity to create beneficial long-term partnerships 
with FinTech firms and obtain cutting-edge technology at an affordable 
price. 
F. TCB Organizational and Chartering Process 
The creation of a paradigm-shifting financial system like the TCB 
requires a methodical approach for initiating and performance-testing each 
aspect of the organization structure and operational activities as they come 
into being. The overall process for organizing the TCB system from 
conception to operational status is illustrated in the following flowchart: 
Table 5. TCB Organizational and Chartering Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
Crosman, Can Big Four Core Banking Vendors Oligopoloy Be Broken?, AM. BANKER (Oct. 
7, 2013), 12:45 PM EDT), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_194/can-big-four-
core-banking-vendors-oligopoly-be-broken-1062654-1.html. Beyond the core systems, 
“middleware” systems offered by FinTech firms such as Yantech, Moven, Stripe, Square, 
Inc., iZettle AB, [BrainTree, Balanced Payments, and Standard Treasury provide financial 
institutions with APIs (application program interface) to develop end-user applications to 
facilitate capital transfers, mobile banking and payments, e-commerce, and personal 
financial money management. 
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The timeline for initiation and completion of the required milestones 
would depend upon and be impacted by numerous factors such as the 
tribe’s legislative process and the timeframe for negotiating a compact for 
cooperative oversight with the U.S. government, but the successful 
completion of a given stage should increase the overall project momentum, 
e.g. creating a sound Tribal Banking Code would help attract experts to 
serve on the Tribal Banking Commission. The crucial first steps of 
establishing the legal codes and regulatory structure for the TCB system 
could be undertaken immediately and solely by the sponsoring tribe(s), 
thereby enabling the process to move forward without reliance upon outside 
parties or waiting for an alignment of favorable circumstances. 
G. SWOT Analysis for the Tribally Chartered Bank 
The TCB system is a new and ambitious enterprise, and should be 
rigorously scrutinized at the conceptual and operational level to determine 
its viability. A SWOT analysis provides a structured planning method to 
evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats involved in a 
project or in a business venture. For the Tribally Chartered Bank project, 
the SWOT analysis can be structured using the following categories: 
Strengths: characteristics of the TCB that give it an advantage 
over others; 
Weaknesses: characteristics that place the TCB at a 
disadvantage relative to others; 
Opportunities: elements in the environment that the TCB could 
exploit to its advantage; 
Threats: elements in the environment that could cause trouble 
for the TCB. 
SWOT analysis for the TCB reveals numerous dynamic factors in each 
category: 
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Strengths 
! tribal sovereignty provides legal basis for competitive market 
advantages; 
! self-regulation allows TCBs to set credit standards appropriate for 
tribal communities; 
! tax advantages of tribal status enhance positive revenue margins; 
! ability to pursue presently unbanked revenue streams; 
! immediate appeal for participation by 566 Native American nations; 
! electronic service platform provides agility to predict/serve new 
commerce trends; 
! avoiding brick-and-mortar branch model allows for low Capex costs; 
! fee-for-service revenue reduces reliance upon deposit and loan 
generation; 
! shortened time to profitability because of lower overhead costs; and 
! ability to provide “patient capital” to tribes through customized 
financing terms. 
 
 
Weaknesses 
! unprecedented endeavor with no equivalent pathway model; 
! must have a financially strong and fully committed Sponsoring Tribe; 
! investments from other tribes may not materialize. 
! concept perception may be tainted by prior history of “off-shore” 
banks; 
! requires FinTech partnering to implement technology platforms; 
! fear of tribal sovereignty/immunity on the part of potential non-tribal 
partners; 
! tribal deposits may require FDIC insurance, adding to administrative 
burden; 
! tribes may be reluctant to work together due to competing economic 
interests; and 
! likely requires co-regulation regime with U.S. government for 
legitimacy. 
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Opportunities 
! service to increasing numbers of Native-owned businesses; 
! ability to bank emerging commerce such as legal cannabis and online 
gaming; 
! become bank of choice for 200+ tribal casinos. 
! establish TCB as one-stop-shop for accessing federal loan guarantee 
programs; 
! “corner the market” for development financing to Native American 
nations; 
! partnerships with innovative FinTech companies readily available; 
! perfect model for banking emerging block chain currencies such as 
Bitcoin; 
! pro-business regulation from Tribal Banking Commission to entice 
new customers; 
! some existing banks may switch their charter to the Tribal Banking 
Commission; and 
! will be high-profile endeavor that can generate significant free positive 
publicity. 
 
 
Threats 
! effort may be viewed as an attempt to skirt U.S. banking laws, rules 
and regulations; 
! failure to create a legally viable and operationally sound Tribal 
Banking Code; 
! inability to appoint expert personnel to Tribal Banking Commission; 
! inability to hire necessary tech/marketing experts to implement TCB 
services; 
! inability to obtain FDIC insurance and/or co-regulation agreement; 
! inability to obtain Federal Reserve Bank Master Account Number; 
! U.S. banking community may react negatively and attack the effort; 
! U.S. government refuses to co-regulate legal cannabis/online gaming 
accounts; and 
! U.S./global banking laws may conflict with TCB code provisions. 
 
Like any new concept and effort, the idea of the TCB system may 
encounter resistance and face rejection for its unprecedented nature. All 
systems and organizations are resistant to change. This is especially true in 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
38 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
 
banking and with respect to bank regulation and supervision. Given the new 
and unique nature of the TCB concept, detailed examination of the 
“Threats” and inherent challenges of the program is warranted in order to 
ensure a realistic assessment of the potential for success. 
G. Challenges of the Tribally Chartered Bank 
Personnel/Governance. One major practical challenge to establishing a 
functional Tribal Banking Commission and TCB is attracting experienced, 
successful banking professionals with impeccable banking credentials. Such 
professionals are a sine qua non to the bank regulatory community granting 
de facto accreditation to the Tribal Banking Commission and the TCB. 
Many successful and established banking professionals of high reputational 
regard may be reluctant to be associated with the concept for fear that it 
may be, or will become, viewed as a rogue or outside-the-law operation. 
Amending the U.S. “dual banking system” to include Tribally Chartered 
Banks. From its very foundation, the United States has embraced a “dual 
banking system,” i.e., heretofore only banks chartered by either a state 
banking department or a federal bank regulatory body have existed. The 
concept of a TCB will thus upset and disrupt a static banking system with a 
history of over 230 years. The inertia of the extant banking system in the 
United States is deeply engrained and highly resistant to change. The 
advent of TCBs will necessitate far-reaching and very broad changes and 
adjustments of state and federal banking laws, rules, and regulations. Such 
adjustments will likely not come easily or quickly, and will require TCB 
stakeholders to engage in an effective campaign with officials of the federal 
government. 
Weakening of Anti-Money Laundering Efforts. Another practical 
challenge facing the TCB is the perception that such banks could weaken 
existing anti-money laundering efforts across the United States and 
worldwide banking systems. For several decades there have been increasing 
intergovernmental efforts to combat illegal activities by taking steps to 
prevent or inhibit the use of the banking systems to move money for 
unlawful purposes. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 directly led 
to the passage of the PATRIOT Act in the United States and to similar 
legislation worldwide. These laws put additional emphasis upon anti-money 
laundering efforts to combat terrorism financing.
109
 The TCB chartered 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism – Topics, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2017). 
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bank may suffer from significant reputational risk as a potential back door 
to escape such heightened bank regulatory supervision, and will need to 
clearly demonstrate its transparency and legitimacy as a new partner in 
curbing unlawful activity.  
Reputational Risks. Yet another practical obstacle is the reputational risk 
of the TCB. The present reality and history of tribally owned banks reflects 
a very checkered past. On the surface, this history reflects poorly on the 
tribes involved with such efforts and thus could negatively affect public 
perceptions of any tribal efforts to establish a TCB. This public perception 
is primed by the notion of the reservation-based “off-shore bank.”110 This 
idea has been widely promoted over the years as a way to offer the 
traditional Swiss-style secrecy and numbered accounts on a United States 
domestic basis through Indian tribes. Those involved in such regrettable 
efforts were members of the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma and the Delaware 
Nation of Oklahoma. Both tribes launched efforts in the 1990s to create 
banks imbued with tribal sovereignty, and both efforts ended in ignominy, 
prison sentences for some, and very bad public relations for the tribes.
111
 
These and similar efforts have to some extent poisoned the waters for tribes 
who wish to create a TCB in a responsible and legally compliant manner. 
At least in the near term, the prior experience of such tribal banking 
institutions may prove to be an extremely difficult challenge to 
overcome.
112
  
The Difficulty of Achieving Comity for the Tribally Chartered Bank. 
There is a possibility that the current bank regulatory infrastructure in the 
United States will resist and deny the concept of a TCB. TCB stakeholders 
will likely need to make a tremendous effort for the community of state and 
federal bank regulators to recognize the authority of a Tribal Banking 
Commission. Further, a United States Supreme Court ruling and/or an act 
of Congress may prove necessary to grant comity to the Tribal Banking 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Tribe Offers First Offshore Bank, INDEP. REC. (Helena, Mont.) (Jan. 17, 2000), 
http://helenair.com/news/state-and-regional/tribe-offers-first-offshore-bank/article_86afb60c-
3d1e-5fdd-8336-7c9642d33de4.html. 
 111. John Parker, Indian ‘Bank’ Founders Convicted of Fraud, Deceiving Tribe,  
NEWSOK.COM (Apr. 30, 1999, 12:00 AM CDT), http://newsok.com/article/2651551; Dana 
Attocknie,  Delaware Nation Citizens Question Leadership, Election Commission,  NATIVE 
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/news/tribal/7582-delaware-
nation-citizens-question-leadership-election-commission. 
 112. Dan Rutherford, Tribal Bank Bypasses FDIC, Has Own Rules on Deposit, TULSA 
WORLD (Mar. 22, 1997, 12:00 AM)),  http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/tribal-bank-
bypasses-fdic-has-own-rules-on-deposit/article_28b4a9e9-2378-5f78-ada5-2cbfc14745a0.html. 
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Commission and to allow a TBC to integrate into the existing global 
financial systems.  
Obtaining FDIC Insurance and Federal Reserve Bank Master Account 
Number. Even if the concept of a TCB becomes recognized via U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling or an act of Congress, additional obstacles remain. 
Although it is legally possible for most any organized group to apply for 
either a state or federal banking charter, that does not mean that all 
applicants will actually receive such charter. Each bank regulatory agency 
will thoroughly review the bank charter application and assess the risks 
posed by the business plan of such application. Many applications are 
denied because of the perception of undue business risks, lack of qualified 
personnel in the proposed bank, insufficient capital, and/or potential 
illegality in the operations of the enterprise.
113
 Accordingly, even if the 
Tribal Banking Commission approves a tribal banking charter that does not 
mean the FDIC will approve the charter for deposit insurance or that the 
Federal Reserve will approve the charter for the issuance of a Federal 
Reserve Bank master account number.  
Both FDIC insurance and a Federal Reserve Bank master account 
number are indispensable components to any bank and are viewed as its 
lifeblood.
114
 The power to grant these attributes lies totally outside the 
control of the Tribal Banking Commission and could prove to be the 
Achilles’ heel of the concept.  
Inability to Attract Investment Capital. In an environment of legal and/or 
regulatory uncertainty with respect to the concept, the organizers of a TCB 
may not be able to attract sufficient capital for launching and sustaining 
operations. Potential investors may feel that the legal and regulatory 
environment is too uncertain or tenuous, thus show reluctance to invest the 
millions of dollars necessary to adequately capitalize a TCB. This concern 
may also extend to possible perceptions of lax regulation by the Tribal 
Banking Commission that could give rise to fears that invested capital may 
be inefficiently applied or siphoned off via unlawful or imprudent 
management acts.  
Fears of Opening “Pandora’s Box”. Another practical threat to the TCB 
concept is fear among bankers and bank regulatory agencies that 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Nathaniel Popper, Banking for Pot Industry Hits a Roadblock, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/business/dealbook/federal-reserve-denies-credit-
union-for-cannabis.html. 
 114. See FIRST NAT’L BANK, THE IMPORTANCE OF FDIC INSURANCE, https://www.the 
first.com/uploadedFiles/THE_FIRST/Images/FDIC%20article.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 
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recognizing and granting comity to one Tribal Banking Commission and 
one TCB will open the doors to a flood of similar efforts by many of the 
hundreds of federally recognized tribes.
115
  While there are only fifty-three 
extant bank regulatory agencies in the United States today (fifty state bank 
agencies and three federal bank agencies), there could potentially be 
hundreds of tribal bank regulatory agencies and perhaps thousands of 
TCBs. Establishing the procedures and logistical structure to ensure 
uniformity of quality, laws, rules, regulations, policies and procedures will 
be paramount. Fears of opening a “Pandora’s Box” of widespread TCB 
activity may combine with a lack of federal will or resources and stall the 
concept. 
These hardships persist in Native American nations despite repeated 
attempts to modify the existing finance system to ameliorate such 
conditions, and despite various federal government interventions into the 
capital markets and financial system designed to improve conditions in 
tribal communities. Although well-intended, federal efforts, such as the 
BIA Loan Guaranty program, consistently fall short in addressing tribal 
needs.
116
 For example, Senator Al Franken described the paucity of funding 
from the program as “embarrassing.”117 Moreover, the United States 
Special Trustee for American Indians Vincent G. Logan has stated: “When 
we talk about economic development, I always tell all the people that I 
work with: credit is how the world was built. We are not going to get very 
far” unless they have access to credit.118  
The lack of financial systems within Native American nations persists 
despite SWOT analysis indicating that the Tribally Chartered Bank risks are 
outweighed by the opportunity to fulfill an urgent and substantial need for 
credit and capital among Native American nations. The inherent challenges 
of creating a new financial system dictate that successful implementation of 
the TCB will require: focused efforts and investment by one or more tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/FR-2016-01-29/pdf/2016-01769.pdf. 
 116. See Appendix (statement of Sen. Al Franken). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Foster Pepper PLLC Videos, Native American Colloquium: Native American 
Development and U.S./Tribal Relations, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Logan 
Address], https://youtu.be/H9Ru4hVsyJM (address by Vincent G. Logan, U.S. special 
trustee for American Indians, at University of Washington Tribal Development Colloquium, 
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governments, beneficial partnership with advanced FinTech firms, and a 
collaborative inter-governmental relationship with the United States. 
V. Policy Recommendations and Next Steps 
The TCB presents an opportunity to create an innovative financial 
institution that can directly address and improve the access-to-capital 
conditions for Native American nations and their members. The TCB 
would also facilitate the delivery of the “patient capital” needed for long-
term economic, infrastructure, and community development in tribal 
communities. “Patient” capital is not unprofitable capital—a TCB must be 
profitable to sustain its operations. However, a TCB need not continually 
and exclusively chase the highest possible profit margin, nor should it 
abandon the financing of lower-margin but socially beneficial activities. A 
TCB can maintain a long-term view of capital productivity consistent with 
the “seven generations” concept, rather than a short-term focus on meeting 
the quarterly expectations of outside financial analysts.
119
 Notably, a TCB 
can prioritize projects that meet the urgent needs of the most overlooked 
communities. 
The next steps for bringing the TCB to fruition involve policy actions by 
the tribal government(s) such as: 
! drafting TCB governance codes that embody consistency, 
transparency, cogent dispute resolution mechanisms, and robust 
oversight; 
! investing in partnerships with FinTech companies to create 
electronic payment infrastructure; and 
! Presenting a workable cooperative regulatory oversight plan to 
U.S. finance authorities. 
The U.S. government, via a corollary set of policy actions, will facilitate 
the implementation of the TCB program by: 
! providing technical assistance for integrating the TCB into 
existing domestic and global electronic payment networks; 
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! designing a clear path of required actions for the TCB to obtain 
FDIC insurance for future depository accounts; 
! working proactively to implement a cooperative regulatory 
oversight regime; and 
! providing guidance and resources to establish electronic security 
and fraud-prevention best practices for the TCB. 
Two key elements for launching the TCB initiative are obtaining an 
initial “critical mass” of support among tribal nations and attaining 
agreement among credible leaders to manage the program’s creation. To 
obtain federal cooperation, tribes must first demonstrate the commitment, 
knowledge, and willingness to invest in the program and create the legal 
and operational infrastructure. In order to build this support, the academic 
community can take an active role in facilitating meetings and discussion 
among tribal leaders, utilizing in person networking and real-time electronic 
participation models similar to the University of Washington’s 2015 Tribal 
Development Colloquium.
120
 Partnering with trans-tribal entities such as the 
National Congress of American Indians and the First Nations Development 
Institute can assist in bringing key leaders into the discussion, and help 
identify appropriate divisions of labor among participating tribes based on 
relative institutional strengths, resources, and administrative capabilities. 
The TCB represents a game-changing paradigm shift in that it: (1) 
disrupts the 240-year model in the United States of the “dual banking 
system” (i.e., only state or federal charters) by creating a tribally chartered 
bank system; (2) is a public policy innovation arising locally and 
organically from tribal communities to intervene in the capital markets to 
address their well-documented and chronic lack of access to financial 
services and capital; (3) represents a commitment to robust bank regulation 
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and supervision married to a “pro-business” environment that welcomes 
and embraces innovations in financial processes and technology; and (4) 
assimilates and distributes “patient” capital for long-term economic, 
community, and social development in Indian Country. The United States 
Special Trustee for American Indians Vincent G. Logan has succinctly 
stated the mutual foundation that underlies contemporary Native American 
development: “We know that economic development and the relationship 
between the [United States] and tribal nations—it all depends upon getting 
the right pieces into place.”121 The TCB provides a unique platform for the 
United States and tribal governments to collaborate and construct a 
“missing piece” within the network of existing financial institutions, and 
launch a purpose-driven vehicle for enhancing access to the capital that is 
essential for Native American socio-economic development.   
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APPENDIX 
United States Senate Oversight Hearing
122
 
Selected Witness Testimony: Accessing Capital in Indian Country 
 
The following excerpts are quotes from the June 17, 2015 testimony of 
the indicated witnesses appearing at the United States Senate Oversight 
Hearing on Accessing Capital in Indian Country. They highlight the issues 
and challenges that impact the accessibility of development capital for 
Native American nations. 
Senator Michael Crapo (R-Idaho): 
Regardless of location, access to capital is one of the most 
important fundamentals of business and economic development. 
 . . . . 
 We know the challenges that Indian Country faces in 
accessing essential business resources are significant. In fact, 
some of our witnesses today have noted in their testimonies that 
Native people are most underserved demographic in terms of 
access to capital.
123
 
Alejandra Castillo, National Director, Minority Business 
Development Agency: 
 Access to capital continues to be the number one impediment 
for Native businesses and other minority businesses. 
 By any socioeconomic indicator, Native Americans are the 
most underserved population in the Country. This means that 
financial literacy, credit history and access to lending institutions 
on or near Native lands may be lower than in other areas of the 
Country.
124
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Derek Watchman, Chair, National Center for American Indian 
Enterprise Development: 
Lower margin projects and start-ups are always challenging to 
finance. 
 Infrastructure projects, which are badly needed in Indian 
Country, are very hard to finance, especially if there is limited 
Federal funding or because tribes have little tax base[.] [I]t is 
hard to do bonds based on limited tax bases. Tribes themselves, 
however, are increasing access to capital through self-financing 
of their business and economic development projects. . . . 
 That is why the National Congress of American Indians and 
NAFOA have repeatedly urged Congress to improve and 
increase the allocations to the BIA loan guarantee program. 
Right now it is set at $7 million.
125
 
Senator Al Franken (D-Minnesota): 
I was hearing that the BIA Loan Guarantee Program is 
underfunded. Mr. Hill just talked about it being badly 
administered. It is hard to get more funding for a program that is 
badly administered. 
 What I am hearing is that $7 million is next to nothing and 
sort of embarrassing, I think. . . . 
 . . . There are bands of tribes in my State that have a great 
need for capital. Because of that, they would be considered a 
high credit risk but that is exactly why they need capital. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . The need in Indian Country is so great. I wonder 
sometimes, the tribes that need it the most, need economic 
development the most, are probably the worst credit risks in a 
sense . . . . 
 I just want to make sure that the bands that need it the most 
get the opportunity to do economic development on their land 
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because they have such high unemployment rates. They need 
something and they need it the most.
126
 
Ross Hill, CEO, Bank2: 
 The BIA Commercial Loan Guarantee Program is truly the 
only guaranteed loan program that can be widely used for nearly 
any need on tribal lands. The program could become a vital 
source of growth and development of Native America . . . . 
 [But] [t]ypically, it is funded about 20 to 30 percent of the 
maximum authorization. This year is a prime example of the 
problem. The BIA is already out of commitment authority. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [B]ut perhaps as many as 200,000 homes are still needed 
on reservations alone. The economic impact of satisfying this 
need could reach as much as $40 billion on the U.S. and Indian 
Country economies. 
 Think of this to picture that. The City of New Orleans has 
200,000 homes. The demand is high, the need is great and the 
opportunity for real economic impact is unquestionable. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The [BIA Loan Guarantee] program is not adequately 
funded, nor is it administrated properly. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The BIA is not very accountable to their customer or to 
the banks. Their process for approval is subject to individual 
offices and subject to different edicts handed down from 
Washington from time to time. The process is not one that can be 
counted on, nor is it one that can be counted on in a timely basis. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [W]e cannot close a transaction and get a guarantee on the 
loan. Without the BIA addressing this problem and making it a 
serious matter . . . most loans will not be completed and funded 
that could be. 
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 . . . . 
 . . . I believe there is just a lack of commitment at the BIA 
office to remedy the problem.
127
 
Dante Desiderio, Executive Director, Native American Finance 
Officers Association: 
While the need for capital to flow freely into Indian Country is 
great, existing Federal capital programs have failed to drive 
economic growth and development that is profoundly needed in 
Indian County. We think it is time to take a different look at 
these programs and ask ourselves why they are not working to 
reach their full potential. 
 . . . The first program is the Indian Loan Guarantee 
Program. . . . [T]he program is not reaching its potential because 
the total amount of Federal funds budgeted is around $7 million 
or $8 million for all of Indian Country. 
 . . . Treasury set aside the Native program from the larger 
CDFI [Community Development Financial Institution] 
program. . . . The program works but again, its entire budget is 
around $15 million for all of Indian Country. 
 . . . We have 70 Native CDFIs that if you average it out, it is 
about $200,000 each, which is not enough for technical 
assistance and loans. 
 . . . . 
 Tribal governments are much different and need much longer 
term capital, much more patient capital. We do not have the 
ability to go to the market and raise equity, so we rely on long 
term, patient capital to grow enterprises. It is a much different 
role. 
 The tribal governments are looking at those enterprises to 
fund programs and services. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . [And] the long term patient capital is needed to build the 
infrastructure and the tribal businesses to provide those program 
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services, even the telecommunications infrastructure that is 
needed for business development.
128
 
Senator Jon Tester (D-Montana): 
I think access to capital in Indian Country is an incredible 
inhibitor to increase the economy and reduce poverty, and 
reduce the necessity for the safety net programs at the Federal 
level.
129
 
[O]pportunities will go for naught if tribal economies are 
struggling – forcing children to take their skills and find jobs 
elsewhere. . . . We can’t let that happen. Our First Americans 
should not have to choose between making a good living away 
from their family and homelands or living in poverty.
130
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